JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Ethical judgments are important in devising responses to moral problems, of course. These judgments come in many forms, from "What is being proposed is morally wrong" to "This safety factor (or margin) is sufficient for the circumstances in which this object or process will operate." Yet people confronted with ethical problems must do more than simply make judgments. They must figure out what to do. This is the reason for calling them "agents."
of science or engineering, takes the main question to be "Who is to blame?" In these cases the restriction of perspective is fairly explicit. However, as I have discussed elsewhere, it is also implicit in the representation of moral problems as dilemmas to which the only solutions are those given with the problem itself, so that the only task is to judge which of the proposed solutions is the best (or least bad).2 It is not enough to be able to evaluate well-defined actions, motives, etc., because actual moral problems are not multiple-choice problems. One must devise possible courses of action as well as evaluate them.
Suppose my supervisor tells me to dispose of some regulated toxic substance by dumping it down the drain. In this case part of my problem is that I have been ordered to do something that is potentially injurious to human health and, furthermore, illegal. Assuming that my supervisor knows, as I do, that the substance is a regulated toxic substance (an assumption that I should verify), then my supervisor's order is unethical and illegal. This is an example of a moral judgment that I make in describing the situation.
In The importance of finding good ways of acting (and not merely the ability to come up with the right answer to a "whether" question) may be brought home by reflecting on when you or I last poured paint solvents, petroleum wastes, acetone (nail polish remover), motor oil, garden pesticides, or other household hazardous waste down the drain (or put spent batteries in the trash). Was it only before we were in a position to know that these were environmental hazards? That is, was it only before we could answer the "whether" question correctly? Or was there a time when we knew it was not a good idea to pour it down the drain but did so because we did not know what else to do?
The need for a response is what makes moral problems practical problems. The similarities between moral problems and another class of practical problems, design problems, are instructive for thinking about the resolution of moral problems and correcting some common fallacies about them.
Practical problems may or may not have solutions. Of those that are moral problems, some call for coping rather than for solving. The perennial problems of human vulnerability, suffering, and mortality are such. Ethical problems that call both for solving and for coping have their counterpart in design problems, although good ways of coping count as "solutions" in the case of design problems. For example, design of a system of drainto them. Analysis is important but it is not sufficient to devise responses.
Design Problems
Engineers recognize the ability to analyze the designs of others (that is, being an astute judge of designs) as Denying that there is a uniquely correct solution goes against some common ways of speaking about ethics, such as "doing the right thing" in a situation. age ditches to cope with (that is, to prevent damage from) periodic flooding of a nearby river counts as solving the problem of how to cope with periodic flooding, although the drainage ditches do not keep the river from flooding.
Design problems are problems of making (or repairing) things and processes to satisfy wants and needs. The analogy with moral problems holds for a variety of design problems, from designing or repairing a bookshelf to devising a rotating work schedule, to designing or redesigning an experiment. The analogy between moral problems and problems of engineering design is especially instructive, however. Like ethics, design is a subject in the university curriculum. Therefore, much has been articulated about the design process in engineering. Furthermore, engineering design stands out among college subjects in giving sustained attention to the synthetic reasoning necessary to construct good responses to practical problems. Because engineering recognizes the importance of engineering design as well as engineering theory, it appreciates the importance of practical as well as theoretical problems and of synthetic as well as analytic reasoning. Devising a good response requires synthetic reasoning. Ethics has paid more attention to analytic reasoning and the analysis of ethical problems and possible answers a useful skill for designers to possess, but not sufficient to make a person a good designer. For this reason, most engineering schools offer courses in engineering design that are markedly different from the engineering theory courses that teach students to understand theory and how to apply it to solving problems with mathematically exact and usually uniquely correct solutions.
The products of design may be single objects (for example, a bridge at a given site) or a type of object (for example, a new type of toaster) or process (for example, a cost effective way of making newsprint from recycled newspapers or a process for making weather-resistant paint). This characterization applies to many types of design outside of engineering and science, but engineering design (and experimental design) are especially instructive for present purposes not only because the design process is well studied in engineering, but because engineering design problems are typically highly constrained, as are challenging ethical problems. The design process, especially in the ways in which it differs from merely analyzing the designs of others, highlights the very aspects of the agent's response to moral problems that philosophy and applied ethics have had difficulty illuminating.
To develop a good response to a moral problem I must typically take account of a variety of considerations. In situations like the one just described where there is a question of either negligence or intentional wrong-doing, one prominent consideration is how to be fair to everyone. There may be some tension or conflict between the moral demands or values associated with some pairs of these considerations, but it is often possible at least partially to satisfy most or all of these demands simultaneously. Indeed, it is a mark of wisdom to be able to do so. This seemingly commonsense observation about ethical problems has been obscured in recent years by a preoccupation on the part of philosophers with construing ethical problems as irresolvable conflicts between opposing principles or obligations. Although such conflicts are occasionally irresolvable, to assume so at the outset is misguided because it defeats any attempt to do what design engineers often do so well, namely, to satisfy potentially conflicting considerations simultaneously.
The Design Analogy
To illustrate the characteristics of a design problem, consider the design of a mechanically simple object: a child seat to fit on the top of the suitcases with wheels designed to be wheeled on board an airplane and stored under the seat or in the overhead bin. When removed from the suitcase, the seat must double as a comfortable child seat that will strap into a vacant airline seat, if one is available, and the seat must also fit easily into the overhead compartment. Several Lisa's and Kimberly's designs are significantly different solutions to the suitcase child seat design problem. For example, in Kimberly's design the long suitcase handle snaps into a clip at the back of the child seat, and a handle that is part of the child seat is used to pull the seat and suitcase. In Lisa's design the long handle on the suitcase continues to be used to pull the bag with the seat attached. The horizontal crossbar that holds the child in place pivots around its permanent attachment to the end of the right armrest and secures into the end of the other armrest. In Kimberly's, the crossbar and armrest form a single U-shaped piece that lifts overhead like an old-fashioned high chair tray, pivoting from two attachments to the back of the child seat. (Both designs have the advantage that they do not detach from the rest of the chair, so they cannot be lost.) Kimberly's design is larger in dimensions. It would lead to a larger seat that might better suit a heavier child, but would be more expensive to manufacture. Lisa's seat would accommodate most children under two years old, the age at which infants fly free with an adult.
The first point about design problems that is important for moral problems is that:
For interesting or substantive engineering design problems, there is rarely, if ever, a uniquely correct solution or response, or indeed, any predetermined number of correct responses.
There may be no solution, however-no way of making a thing that answers a given set of specifications. For example, it is not clear that there is any design of the child seat that would both be small enough to make a reasonable suitcase seat and strong enough to satisfy the additional specifications for a child's automobile safety seat. However, if there is one solution to a design problem, there are usually several.
Both problems of engineering design and moral problems may be trivial in that the specification of the problem leaves little leeway in an acceptable solution. The question of what to do about a promise that one has freely made, in circumstances where no morally compelling counterclaims exist, is trivial in this sense: one should keep it. So is the design of a bolt to fasten the housing of the radar for a large commercial aircraft. In both cases devising an appropriate response is not demanding, so the principal moral question is whether one is sufficiently conscientious in carrying out the action to accomplish the goal.
It is for nontrivial moral problems that the analogy with problems of engineering design is most important. It may not be a great surprise that if there is one course of action that provides an ethically responsible resolution of a moral problem, a somewhat different one may also be acceptable. However, denying that there is a uniquely correct solution does at least go against some common ways of speaking about ethics, such as "doing the right thing" in a situation.
The initial problem about the toxic waste is an interesting ethical problem with several acceptable responses. It may be possible to change the supervisor's mind, perhaps by detailing the potential health effects or the legal liability to the company, or by simply stating that I cannot in conscience dump the waste. If the supervisor is adamant, it may be possible to get others in the company-the ethics or environmental office, if any; the legal department, if any-to countermand his order. The character of my organization makes a difference to my response, too. Although some organizations have a strict chain of command, others, including most universities, make a point of having "multiple channels" for working through problems. There may be several ways of getting the waste disposed of properly while not embarrassing the company or coworkers more than necessary.
This brings me to the second point about design problems:
Although there is not a uniquely correct solution, nonetheless some possible responses are clearly unacceptable-there are wrong answers even if there is no unique right answer-and some solutions are better than others.
A child seat that could not recline when in the airline seat would be more of an irritation than a comfort to the child and accompanying adult. A design that lacked any safeguard should the handle slip out of the adult's hand, and so fall, hitting the back of the seat (and the back of youngster's head) on the floor, would be prohibitively dangerous. These are examples of clear criteria for adequate designs.
It may seem obvious that there are wrong answers to ethical problems. (Dumping the waste down the drain is a wrong answer, as is dumping the waste under the supervisor's spruce trees.) I draw attention to the existence of wrong answers only because people often say, "There are no right or wrong answers" to ethical problems. Theirs may be simply an attempt to acknowledge that there are no uniquely correct solutions to ethical problems or they may be espousing an extreme relativism in ethics.
This leads me to a refinement on the first point above:
Although for interesting or substantive engineering design problems there is rarely, if ever, a uniquely correct solution, two solutions may each have advantages of different sorts, so it is not necessarily true that for any two candidate solutions one must be incontrovertibly better than the other.
In the case of Lisa's and Kimberly's designs, one is not clearly better than the other, although some features of one are clearly better than the corresponding features of the other. If no design feature were constrained by the design of some other feature, it might be possible to collect together the best features into one best design. However, -some features are so constrained; for example, the design of the security strap that fits between the child's legs and runs between the crossbar and the seat depends on the design of the crossbar. Furthermore, even a given feature may be better in some respects (easier to keep clean, more comfortable for the youngster, less expensive to manufacture) and worse in others (more cumbersome for the adult to operate, more likely to break). Such a feature is likely to A third and final point about solutions to design problems that holds for responses to ethical problems as well is that they must do all of the following: * Achieve the desired performance or end-for example, create a child seat that fits on a wheel-on-boardsuitcase or fulfill one's responsibility for environmental safety.
* Conform to given specifications or explicit criteria for this act-for example, the seat must fit inside the overhead rack and be a comfortable booster seat that straps into an airline seat; straightening out the toxic waste issue should not take so much time that I fail in other major responsibilities. * Be reasonably secure against accidents and other miscarriages that might have severe untoward consequences. * Be consistent with existing background constraints-for example, for the child seat do not require very expensive, scarce, or hazardous materials for its manufacture; for any ethical problem do not violate anyone's human rights (so it goes without saying that even if feasible, killing off the supervisor is not an option).
So far the value of the analogy with design problems has been to draw attention to features of ethical problems that often go unnoticed. These features are especially likely to be overlooked when a case is constructed to illustrate philosophical points but the discussion of that case is mistaken for one of how an agent should go about resolving a moral problem. Judith Thomson has constructed a famous example to test the common assumption that the moral permissibility of abortion turns on whether the fetus is a person.3 The example does not, and was not meant to, simulate the problem faced by a woman who is considering abortion and enlightens such a woman only to the extent that her deliberations are influenced by the belief that if the fetus is a person, then abortion is wrong.
Moral Lessons from Design Problems
The value of the analogy with design problems is that it gives us guidance on how to go about responding to moral problems; strategies for addressing design problems have analogs for resolving ethical problems.
First, consider the examination of the situation and definition of the problem. Some assessment is needed just to name the problem. In the case of design problems, the ambiguity is typically limited to lack of knowledge of what potential users might require in a device (and hence the constellation of features in it) and of what solutions are available already. Often it is not clear how far you can go in meeting some requirements and still satisfy others. For example, in the case of a child seat it would be desirable to accommodate large toddlers and three-year-olds, as well as average size two-year-olds, but the suitcase will only support a limited load.
The need at early stages of design to take account of ambiguity or uncertainty is illustrated even more clearly in the design of a complex device. As with the suitcase child seat, the example I choose of a complex device is one so novel that when it was designed, there were no industry standards for the characteristics of such a device. The device is one that automates testing for a variety of immune factors. At the initial stage designers had to decide such questions as how constant the temperature at which the device maintains chemical reactions has to be: Should the specifications be for a temperature of 37?C ? 1? or 37?C ? 0.1?? Once such specifications were decided upon, the designers built a feasibility model, that is, a model that meets the specifications and embodies the core features of the technology. Such a feasibility model demonstrates that it is possible to create the device in question but typically leaves open many questions about the device that will actually be manufactured and sold.
The initial phase of the design of the immunoassay device illustrates the task of problem definition. Engineers recognize the importance of allowing for as much flexibility as possible in the definition of the problem, that is, to avoid foreclosing options to change features or to add new ones in successive models to improve safety, performance, reliability, or manufacturability. Comprehensive foresight prevents difficult or costly changes when far along in the process. For example, retooling for manufacture (changing the manufacturing process) is very expensive.
The first lesson from design problems for moral problems, then, is to begin by considering the uncertainties in the situation. In the case of ethical problems, the situation may be even more ambiguous, creating even more of a challenge for foresight. At least with a design problem it never happens that what seemed to be a problem of designing a bridge turns out to be a problem of designing a tower. In contrast, if one hears from one person that another is doing something wrong, it may be that the second is doing wrong or that the first is slandering the second. All that is certain at the beginning is that something is not as it should be, since the first is telling you that the second is guilty of something.
Appreciating ambiguities and uncertainties is important. These are often underemphasized in professional ethics. For example, the original (1989) edition of On Being a Scientist (the National Academy of Sciences's handbook on research and research ethics for young scientists) recommends that when one believes one has witnessed research misconduct, one should talk it over with a trusted experienced colleague and "[o]nce sure of the facts, the person suspected of misconduct should be contacted privately and given a chance to explain or rectify the situation" (p. 19). Two things are wrong with this piece of advice. One is that, as is now widely recognized, confronting a person who has committed misconduct runs the risk of having him or her destroy the data record or the like. However, the more general point is that it is often not possible to wait for certainty before acting. The advice to act only when one is certain is a license to avoid action.
What is needed are ways of acting that will prove prudent and fair however uncertainties are resolved. In asked to dump toxic waste illegally, there would be a particular person who would be my supervisor whose character I might learn more about. There would be an actual organization (a company, a university) with particular policies that I could investigate.
One of the important characteristics of a responsible or wise response The advice to act only when one is certain is a license to avoid action. Too often when statements of ethical problems are presented to students, their attempts to probe the complexity of the case are cut off. Answering problems without seeking to investigate them is poor training for understanding and addressing actual moral problems.
From the place of brainstorming in the practice of engineering design we learn more about how an agent goes about developing responses. Brainstorming requires an uncritical atmosphere in which people can present half-baked ideas that may later be refined or combined. Articulation of any half-baked ideas is discouraged in the many ethics classes where adversarial debate is the primary method used. Although an adversarial format may provide some useful pre-law training, it does not help develop the ability to think constructively about resolving moral problems.
A rather heroic capacity to brainstorm in the face of criticism is demonstrated in the responses of Carol Gilligan's subject Amy, who was asked to respond to the "Heinz dilemma." When Amy is asked if Heinz should steal a drug he cannot afford in order to save the life of his wife, she proposes new alternatives to either stealing or letting Heinz's wife die:
Well, I don't think so. I think there might be other ways besides stealing it, like if he could borrow the money or make a loan or something, but he really shouldn't steal the drug-but his wife shouldn't die either.4
Asked why he should not steal the drug she replies:
If he stole the drug, he might save his wife then, but if he did, he might have to go to jail, and then his wife might get sicker again, and he couldn't get more of the drug, and it might not be good. So, they should really just talk it out and find some other way to make the money. (p. 28) The brainstorming (in this case "borrowing the money" or, as Amy elsewhere suggests, persuading the druggist to lower the price) and interrogation of the problem are not entirely separable activities. In addressing design problems suggestions from potential users about their needs frequently stimulate new ideas, and ideas for approaches to the design may stimulate new questions for potential users. For ethical problems, additional information gained through interrogating the problem frequently changes the desirability of possible responses.
This point is illustrated by consideration of the following situation: A highway safety engineer is allocating resources for safety improvements and considers two intersections. Both have the same number of fatal accidents per year. However, one is in a rural setting and the other is an urban setting. The urban intersection handles on average four times the number of cars as the rural intersection and also has a higher rate of minor injuries and property damage than does the rural intersection. There is just enough money in the budget to improve one intersection. Which one should it be?
The choice of improving the urban intersection is often justified on the ground that there improvements will have the greatest overall reduction of injury and this choice is cited as illustrating a utilitarian choice of "the greatest good for the greatest number." The choice of the rural intersection is made on the ground that it is a more dangerous intersection in the sense that the likelihood of a fatal accident for a given use of the intersection is four times higher. This consideration is taken to represent concern for fairness (presumably equal distribution of the risk of fatal injury associated with going through any given intersection) or even respect for individual rights.
What is relevant here is not how well this story illustrates the philosophical distinctions between utilitarian and competing foundationalist schools of thought in ethics, but the danger that this example will be misunderstood as an example of problem-solving. Notice first of all that the problem is presented as a forced choice between spending all of the remaining resources on one intersection and spending it all on the other. In fact, there would likely be many other choices. For example, putting up traffic signs at both intersections may be an alternative to installing traffic lights at either one. However, even accepting the multiple-choice character of the problem as stated, there is a great deal of potentially relevant information that the example does not tell us about the accidents. For example, suppose that at one intersection, but not the other, in all serious accidents at least one of the drivers involved was drunk (or fell asleep, or had a heart attack, etc.). Such information might show that the most crucial variable for reducing serious accidents at one site is reducing driver impairment, while at the other it is the physical characteristics of the intersection and is best remedied by changing the intersection itself.
A third lesson from design problems concerns acting under time pressure. It is often important to begin by pursuing several possible solutions simultaneously, so that one will not be at a loss f one meets insuperable obstacles, but still avoid spreading one's engies too broadly This admonition applies both to the design of individual features of the device from the feasibility stage onward, and to approaches to making changes in the design when obstacles are encountered at later stages.
The need to act under pressure of time is also a common feature of ethical problems. In the face of time pressure it is reasonable to pursue several possibilities simultaneously in case one fails to prove practicable. Consider the ideas proposed by Amy, the child who rejects the forced choice of the Heinz dilemma and "brainstorms" a variety of possible courses of action. The simultaneous pursuit of several options is a mark of good design strategy when there is any danger that one line of development may prove unfeasible. Pursuing several options contrasts with representing the moral problem as a static situation with static solutions so that the problem is simply one of selecting the right alternative and doggedly pursuing it.
Fourth and finally, the dynamic diaracter of problem situations has further implications. The problem not only requires clarification, but even changes and develops over the course of time or is replaced by others. For example, in attempting to avert the Challenger accident, engineer Roger Boisjoly's problem situation began with evidence, in the form of blackened grease, that hot gas was escaping through the joints. The problem then became one of conducting experiments to test the effect of temperature on the seals, and then one of getting a seal team formed to redesign the seals and of getting resources to do so. The final problem became one of stopping the flight in view of predicted record cold temperature.
When the dynamic character of the ethical situation is neglected, "making the best of a bad business" is often confused with taking an action that is justified in the general case. For example, a colleague with whom I was working to formulate criteria for research ethics raised the question of whether gift authorship is ever ethicallyjustified. (Gift authorship in a research context is the listing of a person as an author although the person has not contributed substantially to the research reported in the paper.)
My colleague was thinking of a case in which he had an idea for a collaborative project and proposed it to a European researcher who had done some work on a subject that established some of the ground work for the new effort. The European researcher at first expressed interest, but then failed to respond when my colleague actually proposed to start the work. After several communications brought no response, my colleague undertook the work with members of his own lab only. There was some delay because my colleague's group had to recreate some research materials that would have been on hand at the European researcher's lab. In due course my colleague and one of his post-doctoral fellows completed the research and wrote a manuscript reporting the work. As a courtesy because the work was built in part upon the earlier work of the European researcher, my colleague sent a "pre-print," that is, a copy of the unpublished manuscript, to the European researcher. That researcher replied that my colleague could not publish the paper because they had used a virus obtained from the European researcher's lab for a different purpose, and they had not obtained permission to use it for this project. (The sharing of research materials, or the means for making them, is encouraged in science, although no lab is expected to take on great burdens to supply others with materials. Some journals require that those who publish articles in their journal furnish to others the reagents and similar materials necessary to replicate the work. In this case, however, my colleague had agreed to use the virus only for a single purpose. That purpose did not include making materials for the project described in the manuscript.)
Hoping to shame the European researcher into desisting from his complaints, my colleague wrote back asking if there was someone that the researcher thought should be added as an author on the manuscript. The analogy with design problems implies that we should expect that even excellent responses to a problem may be improved upon in many cases. pean researchers to the list of authors on the manuscript. He did this despite his firm conviction that gift authorship is a corrupt practice.
I think that many would agree that he "made the best of a bad situation." This does not show that under some circumstances gift authorship is justified, however, because the situation itself was one that, as an ethical matter, one should avoid. Going along with gift authorship was just the best, or least bad, thing my colleague could think of to do in this situation. In the future he would take care not to get into this situation. He would be more careful to check the conditions under which he received research materials and would not again make the mistake of offering gift authorship as an intentionally sarcastic communication.
Improving on Excellence
Part of the explanation for the misunderstanding and misrepresentation of moral problems is that most of recent ethics and applied ethics have neglected the perspective of the moral agent. Instead, ethics has exclusively emphasized the perspective of the judge or that of a disengaged critic who views the problem from "nowhere" and treats it as a "math problem with human beings." For the agent facing a moral problem, not only are possible responses undefined, but the nature of the problem situation itself is often ambiguous. As a result, the agent faces a whole series the final outcome of the larger story in which the smaller problems are located.
Understanding design activity in engineering, especially in the ways in which it differs from merely analyzing existing designs, highlights the aspects of the agent's response to moral problems that philosophy and applied ethics have had difficulty illuminating. The multiply constrained nature of many problems in engineering design provides an excellent model of challenging moral problems that involve many types of moral considerations, all of which must be taken into account. Many moral problems that are represented as conflicts are better understood as problems in which there are multiple constraints that may or may not turn out to be simultaneously satisfiable.
The analogy with design problems implies that we should expect that even excellent responses to a problem may be improved upon in many cases. I embrace this implication. To frame moral problems primarily from the vantage point of the judge or the moral critic, rather than from that of the person facing the problem, associates ethics with judgment and criticism and creates incentives for people to insulate themselves from criticism, either by narrowing the scope of the problems they address or by developing ready rationalizations for their behavior. However, pressing problems, both individual problems of how to be a good engineer, teacher, parent, or friend, and social problems, such as providing good health care or protecting the environment, are multiply constrained problems that require continuing input and oversight by many individuals and organizations. Recognizing that good resolutions of moral problems can be improved upon should have the salutary effect of promoting open, constructive, and nondefensive discussion of moral problems.
